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The Aesthetics of Human Rights in 
Franz Werfel’s The Forty Days of Musa Dagh
Franz Werfel’s novel The Forty Days of Musa Dagh, originally published in German 
in 1933, is not just as a novel about systematic violations of human rights, but 
above all as a political intervention, in the form of a novel, on behalf of the fun-
damental rights of a certain group of human beings – in this case, the Armenians. 
The genocide of the Armenians at the hands of the fading Ottoman Empire during 
the First World War forms the historical backdrop to the novel. According to esti-
mates by the historian Michael Mann, between 1.2 and 1.4 million Armenians were 
killed in 1915 and 1916 – that is, probably two thirds of the Armenians living in 
the Ottoman Empire at the time (see Mann 2005, p. 140).¹¹³ Ideological rationales 
included the Turkish rulers’ widespread fear that the Armenian population might 
collaborate with Russia, Turkey’s wartime enemy (Mann 2005, p. 143). Economic 
motives also played a role; for example, the expropriation of the (partly prosper-
ous) Armenians served to create a Muslim economic elite loyal to the Young Turks 
(see Adanir and Kaiser 2000, p. 283). Finally, the quest for a “unifying patriotism” 
was seen as essential for holding together the remains of the crumbling multieth-
nic Ottoman Empire (Anderson 2008). The Armenian genocide was not only “suc-
cessful” in that there are almost no Armenians left in Turkey today; its “success” 
has been underscored by the fact that the mass murder has been consistently 
denied by all Turkish governments from 1919 to this day and only received little 
attention abroad. “As time passed, it became the ‘forgotten genocide’,” sums up 
Edward Minasian (Minasian 2007, p. xxx).
According to accounts of what inspired the novel, Werfel came across the 
story of the Armenians in 1929 while traveling in Syria. During a visit to a carpet 
factory, he and his wife saw “emaciated children with El Greco faces and enor-
mous eyes” who, they were told, were “the children of Armenians killed off by the 
Turks” (Mahler Werfel 1958, p. 220). In a note prefacing The Forty Days of Musa 
Dagh, Werfel states that it was the “miserable sight of some maimed and famish-
ed-looking refugee children” that gave him “the final impulse to snatch from the 
Hades of all that was, this incomprehensible destiny of the Armenian nation” 
(Werfel 1934, p. v). For Werfel, the task of the literary text – following a tradi-
tion that dates back to classical antiquity – derives from its ability to preserve 
113 Other estimates put the death toll at between 800,000 up to 1.5 million; see Adanir and 
Kaiser (2000), p. 282.
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the memory and the sufferings of the dead against “time’s destructive force” 
(Assmann 1996, p. 124). Literature is able to do so by transforming one medium 
into another: The literary text converts the “miserable sight” seen by the author 
into writing, and, in the eyes of the readers, back into an imaginary visualization 
of an otherwise forgotten “that was.” That the recollection of the Armenian kill-
ings is capable of eliciting major political fears and backlashes can be seen by 
looking at the reception of Werfel’s novel – and the history of its failed filming in 
the 1930s (see Welky 2006).
In this essay, I will attempt to interpret Werfel’s novel as a draft to an aes-
thetics of human rights. I would like to argue in the following steps: First (II.), 
I’ll try to show how the issue of human rights can be understood as an aesthetic 
problem, and in the strictest sense as a problem of imagination. Based on Hannah 
Arendt’s and Joseph Slaughter’s critique of human rights, my thesis will be that 
the aesthetic of human rights can be interpreted as the installation of a normative 
imagination of a specific image of “man” – the “citizen”, which is always male, 
“white”, and bourgeois. Second (III. and IV.), a reading of The Forty Days of Musa 
Dagh will lead to the thesis that Werfel’s novel is structured by an aesthetics of 
human rights. This means that the Armenians are represented here not only as 
victims of a genocide, but at the same time as subjects of a “Bildungsroman” in 
which they develop into “citizens” and thus to legitimate holder of human rights. 
Werfel’s text, thus, performs an inversion – or, more precisely, an expansion – of 
the preference of the human rights (and of the “Bildungsroman”) towards “bour-
geois, white male citizen”, since the Armenians are depicted as a non-European 
and non-bourgeois group. 
“Men are born and remain free and equal in rights.” Thus reads the first sen-
tence of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.¹¹⁴ In fact, it 
reads like a reply to the opening statement of Rousseau’s Social Contract of 1762: 
“Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains” (Rousseau 1782). It is only 
through a cursory reading, however, that Rousseau’s sentence can be understood 
as a call to return to natural freedom. On the contrary, by emphasizing that man 
is in chains “everywhere,” Rousseau rather stresses a fundamental difference 
between the sphere of the “state of nature” and the sphere of political order (see 
Fetscher 1993, p. 102–103). In contrast, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen grounds political freedom in “bare natural life – which is to say, 
114 An English translation of the Declaration can be found, for example, at http://avalon.law.
yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp. The first article of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948 – “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” – is an almost 
verbatim quote of this sentence; see http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
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the pure fact of birth,” negating any difference between “nature” and “politics” 
(Agamben 1998, p. 75). The political life is thus determined by his “nature” – with 
nature, in the tradition of the natural law, referring both to “man’s” existence 
prior to civilization and to “man’s” timeless essence, the core of his being (see 
Hamacher 2004, p. 346). Insofar as these two dimensions of “man’s” “nature” 
inevitably fail to describe empirical human beings – who, in 1789 just as today, 
are liable to find out that they are not born free and equal in rights – the Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, in the figure of “man,” established a 
political fiction: namely that of “Man” as “a completely emancipated, completely 
isolated being” – who, as Hannah Arendt has noted critically, “seemed to exist 
nowhere” prior to his invention in the Declaration (Arendt 1962, p. 291). Postulat-
ing this fiction laid the foundations for a key political strength of human rights, 
as the obvious gap that exists between a freedom posited as “natural” and the 
empirical lack of freedom can be taken as a perennial call to political action. As a 
“utopian program,” human rights generate a political imagination that forces us 
(or, at least, should have the power to force us) to make political reality conform 
to a fictional image – even though this image may never have accorded with any 
reality in the first place (see Moyn 2010, p. 1).
Hannah Arendt, in her Origins of Totalitarianism, has shown that this polit-
ical fiction produces a number of logically related paradoxes – which she calls 
“aporias of human rights.” First of all, there is the relationship between “nature” 
and “history.” By referring not to “history,” but to a “nature” thought to be unal-
terable, human rights claim to be fundamentally different from “privileges which 
history had accorded certain strata of society” – even though their formulation 
came out of the specific historical situation of the French Revolution. “Historical 
rights,” writes Arendt, “were replaced by natural rights” (Arendt 1962, p. 298). 
From this paradox follows the aporetic relationship between human rights and 
civil rights. Ever since 1789, when “the French Revolution combined the dec-
laration of the Rights of Man with the demand for national sovereignty,” both 
have seemed to be inextricably intertwined: Apparently universal and valid for 
all, human rights are at the same time proclaimed to be the rights of the citizens 
of a specific nation-state, which is why Arendt states that “human rights were 
protected and enforced only as national rights” (Arendt 1962, p. 230). The associ-
ation between human rights and the creation of national sovereignty is therefore 
more than an accident of history. By emphasizing that it takes national rights for 
human rights to be acknowledged and guaranteed – that is, to be more than in -
effective proclamations of pure humanity – Arendt underlines the importance of 
institutional structures that defend and protect human rights, even though these 
institutions enter into an inevitable conflict with human rights (see Gündoğdu 
2011, p. 9).
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Following Arendt, a number of authors have criticized the linkage between 
universal human rights and nationally defined civil rights. Joseph Slaughter 
writes that “[h]uman rights are not yet the rights of humanity in general; they are 
the rights of incorporated citizens” (Slaughter 2007, p. 89). Arendt has described 
the disastrous historical consequences of this linkage: stateless people, whose 
numbers burgeoned after the First World War, not only lost their affiliation with a 
political community, but hence also their human rights: “The mere fact of being 
human did no longer confer any rights.”¹¹⁵ Without the protection and recogni-
tion of human rights by the nation-state, all that remains is the “abstract naked-
ness of being human” (Arendt 1962, p. 299). Arendt’s analysis of human rights 
therefore boils down to an aporia: human rights are in actual fact civil rights, the 
rights guaranteed to citizens of a particular nation, or else they are the rights of 
those who have no rights and therefore nothing but empty words (see Rancière 
2004a, p. 302).
Linking human and civil rights enormously enhanced the status of the nation 
as sole guarantor of political rights; the question of the nation thus became a key 
political problem of modernity. Arendt accordingly emphasizes that the creation 
of human rights indirectly enabled modern nationalism: since the state alone 
guaranteed the human rights of its citizens, it lost “its legal, rational appear-
ance and could be interpreted by the romantics as the nebulous representative 
of a ‘national soul’” (Arendt 1962, p. 231). By surrounding the reified state with a 
“pseudomystical aura of lawless arbitrariness,” the nation itself is increasingly 
conceived as a natural – as opposed to an historical, or contingent – entity (Arendt 
1962, p. 231). In his commentary on the problem of human rights, which closely 
follows Arendt’s argument, Giorgio Agamben emphasizes that linking human 
rights to the civil rights guaranteed by the nation state has made the question of 
“which man was a citizen and which one not” a key problem of modern biopo-
litics (Agamben 1998, p. 76). With the state becoming first the guarantor of the life 
of its citizens and then an organic corpus mysticum, an individual’s participation 
in this collective body becomes the political issue that drives all forms of racism 
and fascism in modern times (see Koschorke, Lüdemann, Frank and Matala de 
Mazza 2007). The Declaration of the Rights of Man enormously exacerbates the 
problem of political exclusion, which is why Arendt demands that the “right to 
have rights” – that is, an individual’s right to belong to a political community – 
should be a basic right (Arendt 1962, p. 298).
115 “… entsprach dem bloßen Menschsein keinerlei Recht mehr”; see Arendt (2006), p. 619. The 
passage in which this phrase appears in the German version is missing in the English version.
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Human rights thus formulate a yet unsolved problem of participation in poli-
tical life that, since 1789, has been circumscribed by the borders of the nation-
state and the possession of citizenship (see Joas 2013, p. 18). If one assumes, as 
Rancière does, that aesthetics is at the core of politics, this problem is an aesthetic 
issue – that is, a problem of the visibility (and perceptibility) of certain human 
beings or groups in political discourses (see Rancière 2004b, p. 13 and Rancière 
1999, p. 58). It is, however, not only at this abstract level – at which every ne -
gotiation of political participation and perception can be called an aesthetic 
issue – that we can compare the implementation of human rights with aesthetic 
practices. A special role has been ascribed to the capacity for imagination. Rooted 
in aesthetic discourses since the Renaissance, imagination has been described 
again and again as a key prerequisite for the development of empathy (see 
Schulte-Sasse 2001 and Kaveny 2009, p. 110–111). Against this background, Lynn 
Hunt, in her book Inventing Human Rights, describes the development of the 
novel (in particular, the epistolary novel) in the second half of the eighteenth cen-
tury – which was both predicated on and encouraged a new technique of imagi-
native and identificatory reading (see Kleinschmidt 1979, p. 50–51) – as the central 
cultural foundation for the emergence of human rights (Hunt 2007, p. 50–51). “In 
the eighteenth century,” Hunt writes, “readers of novels learned to extend their 
purview of empathy. In reading, they empathized across traditional social bound-
aries between nobles and commoners, masters and servants, men and women, 
perhaps even adults and children” (Hunt 2007: 40). It may be doubted, however, 
whether a reading-inspired extension of empathy is a sufficient explanation for 
the development of human rights (see Joas 2013, p.  59). Empathy, it might be 
said, does not function universally but selectively. Since suffering in “real life” is 
not always structured in an aesthetic way – simply because reality is ultimately 
not structured in an aesthetic way –, fictions may be regarded as being able to 
produce a more universal empathy than suffering in real life does. Fictional texts 
may be able to promote empathy with human beings, but due to their aesthetical 
structure they set the conditions under which a suffering human being can be 
given sympathy and empathy. In this sense, Rousseau had already been critical 
of imagination-fueled sympathy, arguing that melodramatic suffering here all too 
easily upstaged real suffering (see Kohns 2007, p. 47).
This problem is taken into account by Slaughter who analyzes the connec-
tion between aesthetic imagination and the formulation of human rights. In his 
Human Rights, Inc., Slaughter argues that human rights and the narrative genre of 
the Bildungsroman are closely related. He defines the genre rather conventionally 
as a narrative elaboration of the protagonist’s socialization in the form of an even-
tually harmonious relationship between individual self-determination and social 
determinism (see Slaughter 2007, p. 100). Insofar as both human rights and the 
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Bildungsroman are predicated on, and produce, the same norms and forms for an 
individual’s socialization, Slaughter sees their relationship as one of “codepend-
ency” (Slaughter 2007, p.  52). For Slaughter, who takes his cues from Arendt’s 
critique of human rights, these norms and forms undergo an ideologically driven 
elevation from the particular to the universal by nominating the “bourgeois white 
male citizen to universal subject” (Slaughter 2007, p.  4). The hero of the novel 
is not universal “Man,” but a specific representative of a cultural and political 
constellation that the novel is capable of turning into a universal norm. Though 
the novel as an aesthetic form is able to produce sympathy and empathy with its 
heroes, and it can be seen as an invitation for sympathy with human beings in 
general, this process includes a normative imagination of what a human being 
should look like. 
According to Slaughter, human rights and the Bildungsroman are “mutually 
enabling fictions: each projects an image of the human personality that ratifies 
the other’s idealistic visions of the proper relations between the individual and 
society and the normative career of free and full human personality develop-
ment” (Slaughter 2007, p. 4). These two dimensions – the idealistic notion of the 
relationship between individual and society, and the normative notion of free and 
full personality development – are mutually dependent on each other. Slaugh-
ter refers to Étienne Balibar’s term of the “citizen subject,” which, as the latter 
argues, has taken the place of the “subject” since the French Revolution. While 
the “subject” is conditioned to obey rulers and other authorities, the “citizen 
subject” is subject only to laws; however, he has to obey them more uncondition-
ally than any subject has ever had to obey a prince (see Balibar 1991, p. 48–49). 
For Slaughter this transition is made possible because of the power of education 
that makes citizens internalize respect for the law. As a fictional articulation of 
this process in its ideal form, the Bildungsroman produces, in Slaughter’s words, 
“a narrative pattern for participation in the egalitarian imaginary of the new 
bourgeois nation-state”; the Bildungsroman tells the story of men’s transforma-
tion into law-abiding, loyal, and thus free “citizens” (Slaughter 2006, p.  1410). 
Seen from this perspective, the novel, including the Bildungsroman, appears as 
a key cultural form that, by presenting an eventually harmonious order between 
the individual and the state, makes it possible to “imagine” both human and civil 
rights (see Slaughter 2007, p. 4). 
Thus, to imagine human rights is to imagine the figure of the citizen, which is 
why the Bildungsroman, as a narrative of becoming a citizen, seems to be a form 
particularly suited to imagining human rights. Imagining human rights in an aes-
thetic medium – such as, for example, the novel, particularly the Bildungsroman 
– thus has a specific function: It makes available a cognitive model both of an 
individual’s development into a citizen and of a person’s legitimate legal status 
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and thus mediates between the proclamations of human rights and empirical 
reality (analogous to the schema of imagination in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
[see Kant 1922, p. 114–115]). As vehicle for imagining human rights, fictions gain 
political importance while remaining ideologically unstable. Fictions can adopt 
a normative perspective (by positing the “bourgeois, white male citizen” as social 
norm), but they can also make visible and audible formerly negated or repressed 
demands for human and civil rights – and thus draw attention to what Rancière 
has called “scenes of dissensus” (Rancière 2004a, p. 304). Or, to quote Slaughter, 
“the projection of a normative egalitarian imaginary not only sets the terms and 
limits of universality’s constituency, it makes possible nonhegemonic rearticula-
tions of universality’s compass” (Slaughter 2007, p. 5).
That Werfel’s novel The Forty Days of Musa Dagh aims to be something other than 
a sentimental portrayal of human suffering is shown by the political discourses 
that are inserted into the text, especially the two “Interlude of the Gods” chapters 
set in Constantinople. Clearly taking his cues from Johannes Lepsius’ 1916 Bericht 
über die Lage des Armenischen Volkes in der Türkei (Report on the Situation of 
the Armenian People in Turkey) as well as his 1930 account, Der Todesgang des 
Armenischen Volkes (The Way to Death of the Armenian People), Werfel actually 
grants Lepsius an appearance in the novel.¹¹⁶ The conversation between Lepsius 
and Enver Pasha in the first “Interlude” in particular shows that Werfel was inter-
ested in the ideological motivation behind the genocide. Confronted by Lepsius 
with the “Armenian question,” Enver Pasha, in Werfel’s account, marshals every 
argument he can think of in favor of ethnic nationalism (Werfel 1934, p. 132). Not 
without contradicting himself, Lepsius first refers to the Armenians as Enver’s 
“fellow-countrymen” and immediately afterwards as “another race [Nation], 
with the conclusion being in both cases that the Ottoman army has no right to 
annihilate the Armenians” (Werfel 1934, p.  136). Enver rejects both arguments, 
calling the Armenians, in a paradoxical turn of phrase, “internal enemies”: an 
enemy within the state that not only stands in the way of the enforcement of the 
“national will,” but, by hindering the nation’s unity, even prevents the formation 
of this will (Werfel 1934, p.  135–136). Taking the metaphor of the nation as an 
organic body literally, Enver sees the Armenians – who for him are only a nui-
116 The conversation between Lepsius and Enver Pasha and the account of the deportation of 
the inhabitants of Zeitun are in parts taken verbatim from Lepsius’ report; see Lepsius (1930), 
p. xii–xviii, and 4–11. As for the events on Musa Dagh, Werfel based his account on the priest 
Dikran Andreasian’s report about “Zeitun and Suedije,” which was published in German trans-
lation in 1919 in an anthology edited by Lepsius; see Kugler (2000), p. 124.
 The Aesthetics of Human Rights in Franz Werfel’s The Forty Days of Musa Dagh   163
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 16.05.17 13:27
164   Oliver Kohns
sance in the formation of a “natural [sic] empire” (Werfel 1934, p. 138)¹¹⁷ – not as 
human beings but as pathogens in the body of the Turkish people. “There can be 
no peace … between human beings and plague germs,” postulates Werfel’s Enver, 
anticipating the rhetoric of the Nazis (Werfel 1934, p. 139). Through the perspec-
tive of Johannes Lepsius, Werfel’s analysis of the genocide transcends the clichés 
of “Asiatic barbarous backwardness” and presents it as the consequence of the 
“narcotic of nationalism,” that is, as a product of the country’s modernization 
(Werfel 1934, p. 139).
The second “Interlude of the Gods” then plays out the conflict that continues 
to be central to human rights discourse to this day – that is, the conflict between 
the imperative of universal human rights on the one hand and the insistence on 
national sovereignty on the other hand. There, Lepsius tells a nameless German 
privy councilor: “This isn’t by any means a mere matter of domestic policy, for 
the Turks to settle as they see fit. Not even the complete extermination of a tribe 
of pygmies can be considered as entirely a matter between exterminators and 
victims” (Werfel 1934, p. 532). It is only consistent that the fight for human rights 
thus shifts away from the question of national sovereignty towards a “Weltinnen-
politik” (global domestic politics) that also includes the colonialist regimes of 
Africa. By focusing the main story on the fate of the Armenians, Werfel’s novel 
clearly sides with Lepsius’ arguments, resisting the German privy councilor’s 
desire to avert his eyes from what is happening. The novel tries to refute Enver 
Pasha’s ideology and to present the Armenians as human beings – which, in the 
era of human rights, means: as potential citizens.
That Werfel decided to act on his allegedly galvanizing encounter in Syria 
by writing a historical novel – and not a political or documentary treatise – is 
not a matter of course (see Buch 1987, p. 113). We therefore need to ask what it is 
that fiction in particular can do on behalf of political intervention – in this case, 
to demand human rights or lament their massive violation. The answer unde-
niably is to be found in the specific form of imagination conveyed by the novel. 
The fictional character of The Forty Days of Musa Dagh becomes evident in those 
elements of the novel that Werfel could not have taken from any of his sources – 
because he made them up. Among these elements are changes in the historical 
chronology that serve to heighten the symbolism. The eponymous “forty days” 
are a case in point: While the historical flight of the Armenians to Musa Dagh 
lasted forty-six days (Minasian 2007, p. 21–22), Werfel’s “forty days” not only refer 
to the forty days that Moses spent on Mount Sinai – “Musa Dagh” means “Moun-
tain of Moses” (Werfel 1934, p. 295) – but also to the “forty-year crossing of the 
117 The German original reads “nationales Reich”; see Werfel (1990), p. 164.
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desert of the children of Israel” mentioned in the novel.¹¹⁸ The most significant 
deviation from the historical record, however, is the introduction of the Bagra-
dian family for which there is no historical evidence.
The main focus is on Gabriel Bagradian, the novel’s protagonist and the 
leader of the Armenians on Musa Dagh. The parallels to the mythical figure of 
Moses are striking (see Eke 1997, p. 712). Like Moses in the Exodus story, Gabriel – 
who had lived in “complete assimilation” in Paris for the past twenty-three years 
and, since his marriage to Juliette, a Frenchwoman, had been “more French than 
ever” and “Armenian … only in a sense – academically” (Werfel 1934, p. 5–6) – 
assumes his leadership role as a complete outsider and stranger among the 
Armenians. It might be argued that Werfel, by inserting Gabriel Bagradian into 
the story and thus creating the impression that the Armenians were capable of 
survival only because of a “Westernized” leader, does not do justice to the actual, 
historical resistance of the Armenians at Musa Dagh. As Ritchie Robertson has 
noted, however, the figure of Gabriel fulfills a narrative function: As a “Europe-
anized” Armenian, Gabriel mediates between the “Oriental,” foreign Armenians 
and the (implied) ‘Western’ readers of the German-language novel and is thus 
able to encourage the development of empathy with the fate of the Armenians 
(see Robertson 1992, p. 253). It needs to be noted, however, that Gabriel’s perspec-
tive on the differences between the “European” and the “Oriental” way of life is 
undergoing a fundamental transformation in the course of the story, as the devel-
opment of the fictional character is defined by his increasing “re-nationaliza-
tion” – that is, a return to his Armenian “roots” and his progressive identification 
with the Armenians.
At the beginning of the story, Gabriel is introduced as “a scholar, a bel esprit,” 
a philosophizing cosmopolitan who does not care much about nationalities: “He 
was a thinker, an abstract man [ein Mensch an sich]” (Werfel 1934, p. 6–7). Like 
Arendt’s study of totalitarianism several years later, Werfel’s novel, too, sets out 
to prove the impossibility and barrenness of being an “abstract man.” The “new 
direction to fate” that brings Gabriel, together with his family, first to Stambul 
and eventually to Musa Dagh is therefore the first step towards his taking leave of 
his identity as a “Mensch an sich” (Werfel 1934, p. 7). Intuiting the coming calam-
ity, Gabriel explains to his wife: “My ancestors in me, who suffered incredible 
things, can feel it. … Nobody could understand who hasn’t been hated because 
of his race” (Werfel 1934, p. 63). He was, he now realizes, “Armenian! In him an 
ancient blood-stream, an ancient people” (Werfel 1934, p.  28). Gabriel is “re-
118 “… vierzigjährige Wüstenwanderung der Kinder Israels”; see Werfel (1990), p. 780. This pas-
sage has been left out in the (abridged) 1934 translation.
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nationalized” by recognizing his biological and psychological roots and by 
becoming aware of the “ancestors in [him]” and their – and thus also his own – 
collective, ethnic history of persecution.
Whereas Gabriel initially sees himself as a “bad speaker,” concluding that 
he could never be a “leader of the people,” he realizes, at the moment of greatest 
danger, that he has the ability to become the military and political leader of the 
fugitive Armenians (Werfel 1934, p. 59). The moment when Gabriel speaks to the 
“people” [Volk] of the Armenian villages at the foot of Musa Dagh to incite and 
encourage it to flee to the mountain, seems to be a critical turning point in his life: 
He knew with his whole being: ‘For this one second it’s worth while to have lived.’ Always, 
when talking to these villagers, his Armenian had seemed laboured and embarrassed. But 
now it was not he who spoke to them – and this knowledge brought him complete peace – it 
was the force which had brought him here, down the long, winding road of centuries, the 
short, twisted path of his own life. He listened in amazement to this power, as it found the 
words in him so naturally. (Werfel 1934, p. 206)
The passage is about self-discovery, which paradoxically comes through this 
being seized from outside: As “the force which had brought him here,” Gabriel’s 
“ancestors in [him]” speak through him, and it is then and there, as it were, that 
his process of becoming aware of his Armenian origins is completed. By speaking 
in a foreign voice, Gabriel finds himself and regains access to his native tongue 
which had become foreign to him after spending more than two decades in France. 
Following the logic of the topos of inspiration, this becoming aware happens effort-
lessly, transforming Gabriel’s previously “laboured [gekünstelte]” relationship to 
his own language into a natural one. Given this transformation, it is possible to read 
Gabriel’s stay on Musa Dagh as a process of subjectivation that can be described, 
by using Slaughter’s categories, as acculturation, apprenticeship, and socialization 
(Slaughter 2007, p. 100). Werfel’s novel can thus be understood as a Bildungsroman.
The Forty Days of Musa Dagh unfolds a structure of the “double subject” – double 
subject, double topic.¹¹⁹ Gabriel Bagradian, who first sees himself as a universal, 
“abstract man” – as a pure individual – learns at the outset of the novel what it 
means to be an “Ottoman subject” of Armenian background (Werfel 1934, p. 7). 
The crimes committed by the government in Constantinople render it impossible 
119 According to Slaughter, the genre of the Bildungsroman has “double subjects”: “it imagines 
a relational individualism – a harmonious concordance of the person’s universalist predisposi-
tions and the interpellative force of social formations and relations, of which the human person-
ality is a part and an effect” (Slaughter 2007, p. 100).
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to have a “harmonious concordance” of an Ottoman subject and the “social for-
mations and relations” of his nation, but Werfel’s text nevertheless adheres to the 
genre rules of the Bildungsroman by proposing a second collective subject: the 
Armenian people on Musa Dagh. By becoming increasingly aware of his Arme-
nian roots, that is, his ethnic, biological and cultural background, Gabriel is able 
to experience, in a completely harmonious way, the formation of his new but at 
the same time ‘real’ self as part, and as consequence, of his relationship with the 
Armenians as a collective people. It is only in the course of the novel, however, 
that this collective group (whose existence is necessary to render the relationship 
between the two subjects completely harmonious) comes into being as a poli-
tical subject – primarily because Gabriel’s enthusiasm and commitment offer his 
fellow Armenians the option of self-determination and survival on the mountain 
as an alternative to certain death in deportation. 
In this sense, the unity of the Armenian “people” [Volk] is established only 
when it assembles in front of Gabriel and when he speaks to it. The “people” here 
for the first time appears as a grammatical subject and an active protagonist: 
By one o’clock the people had begun to arrive. … The people massed on the wide empty 
space in front of the house. About three thousand men and women. … Gabriel Bagradian 
stayed as long as possible in his room, the windows of which were turned away from the 
crowd. … He came out of the house only when Ter Haigasun sent for him. Sallow, despond-
ent faces stared up at his, not three thousand, but one face only. It was the helpless face of 
exile, here as in hundreds of other places at this hour. (Werfel 1934, p. 201–2)
The “people” receives its unity – literally its “one face” – only at the moment when 
it is seen and addressed by Gabriel as one. As Gabriel finds his (Armenian) voice, 
he is at the same time capable of conferring upon the “people” the unity of a face 
and a voice. The term of the “people” is marked by an ambivalence: While the 
gathered “crowd” is in the process of becoming a political subject (the Armenian 
“people”), it is (still) a “people” in the pejorative sense of the word, the common 
people [das bloße Volk], that is, the suppressed, exiled, and hopeless masses.¹²⁰ 
It is only after Gabriel’s speech that the two terms – the “people” as a potentially 
independent political body and the “people” as the humiliated, expelled and per-
120 This fundamental ambivalence inherent in the notion of the “people” has been described 
by Agamben: “It is as if, in other words, what we call people was actually not a unitary subject 
but rather a dialectical oscillation between two opposite poles: on the one hand, the People as 
a whole and as an integral body politic and, on the other hand, the people as a subset and as 
fragmentary multiplicity of needy and excluded bodies; on the one hand, an inclusive concept 
that pretends to be without remainder while, on the other hand, an exclusive concept known to 
afford no hope”; see Agamben (2000), p. 30.
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secuted dregs of the Ottoman state – can be differentiated. In Werfel’s novel, this 
split happens via the Armenians’ different responses to Gabriel’s proposal. As the 
narrator comments rather subjectively, “the Armenian, too, could not rid himself 
of his doglike fear and servility towards this benevolent state.”¹²¹ This explains 
why one group of Armenians stands by Pastor Nokhudian and obeys the depor-
tation order, while the bigger group follows Gabriel to defy the authorities and to 
organize itself politically on Musa Dagh. While the group headed by Nokhudian 
marches towards its death, the remaining Armenians retreat to the mountain to 
no longer live as subjects of the Sultan, but under their own government. “Musa 
Dagh! Mountain of Moses! At its summit, in the grey dawn-light, a whole popu-
lation [das ganze Volk] set up its camp,” the beginning of the second book notes 
triumphantly (Werfel 1934, p. 295). The “whole population” [das ganze Volk] has 
now become the subject of its own history.
From this moment on, there are two separate embodiments of the Armenian 
“people” in Werfel’s novel. This split, which is enacted through the separation 
of the two groups following Gabriel’s speech, makes it possible to juxtapose 
accounts of the oppression and annihilation of the Armenians with a positive 
counter-image. Through this doubling, Werfel’s novel is able to present the Arme-
nians as a group of rightless outcasts and at the same time as a self-governed 
(albeit small and threatened) nation composed of a people with human and 
civil rights. By means of this contrast – which is heightened by the fact that the 
story of the Armenians on Musa Dagh is interrupted again and again by reports 
of what happened to the deported Armenians – Werfel’s account of the horrible 
events becomes more than a humanistic plea for empathy with the victims; it 
becomes a political demand for human and civil rights. The discrepancy between 
the rightless and killed Armenians and their politically organized counterparts 
on Musa Dagh is – to use Rancière’s terms – an enactment of a dissensus, that is, 
of a “division … in the ‘common sense’” as to the question of who is entitled to 
rights and who is not (Rancière 2004a, p. 304). This also explains Werfel’s deci-
sion to present the genocide “by means of an atypical episode” (Kugler 2000, 
p. 122) instead of focusing on the deportations and killings. This contrasting tech-
nique transforms a potential discourse of empathy into a discourse of rights – and 
thus forms the core of the political aesthetics in Werfel’s novel: his imagination of 
human rights. 
121 “… das hündische Gefühl der Angst und Ergebenheit gegen diesen wohlwollenden Staat 
wurde auch der Armeniersohn nicht los”; see Werfel (1990), p. 247. This sentence has been left 
out in the (abridged) English translation.
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The two embodiments of the Armenian “people” in Werfel’s novel thus 
stage two different ideas of political organization. The decision to remain sub-
jects of the Ottoman state has made veritable martyrs of the Armenians led by 
Nokhudian. In contrast, the Armenians who have decided to escape to Musa 
Dagh immediately start to “choose representatives” [Führer], form a “council of 
leaders,” and appoint the priest Ter Haigasun “Supreme Head of the People” 
(Werfel 1934, p. 217–19). Given this vocabulary – and the novel’s pro-Armenian 
stance – Werfel has occasionally been accused of having been infected by the 
language and logic of a totalitarian regime (that is, that of the National Socialists, 
which gained power just around the time when he wrote The Forty Days on Musa 
Dagh).¹²² In the eyes of these critics, Werfel has sketched a totalitarian vision 
of a political community that is predicated on an almost “Manichean” opposi-
tion between Christians/Armenians on the one hand and Muslims/Turks on the 
other hand (see Heizer 1996, p.  76). They overlook, however, that the political 
organization of the Armenians on Musa Dagh described by Werfel is anything 
but the utopian organic community envisioned by fascist ideology. The poli-
tical organization of the Armenians on Musa Dagh is based not on a belief in 
a mythically reified “leader” or on the ideology of a “Volksgemeinschaft,” but on 
the casting of votes, elections and, again and again, arguments and discussions 
about important decisions. The Armenians transform themselves from subjects of 
the Ottoman state to Balibarian “citizen subjects” – that is, not subject to a ruler, 
but subject only to the law. Reading the novel, thus, tells something about the 
relation on the imagination of human rights in a novel: Since The Forty Days of 
Musa Dagh develops an imagination of the human rights, it is necessarily related 
to its ideology, the installation of the imagination of the “male bourgeois white 
citizen” as normative image. In this process, Werfel’s novel performs an expan-
sion of the ideology of human rights to include the explicitly non-European and 
non-bourgeois Armenians.
Translated by Manuela Thurner 
122 See Heizer (1996), p.  87–88; Buch (1987), p.  114–115; Eke (1997): 715; and Kugler (2000), 
p. 144–145.
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